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Summary
The relationship between women’s development and microfinance has received grow-
ing attention from economists during the last two decades. Microfinance is often seen
as a roadmap for poverty reduction and women’s empowerment. United Nations
also refer to microfinance as one of the pathways to reach Millenium Development
Goals (MDGs) within 2015.
Extensive research has been done to assess the impact of microfinance on several
development and welfare indicators at micro level. This paper examines whether
microfinance is so substantial that the effects also show up in the aggregate. Using
panel data on microfinance from over 79 countries covering the period 1995-2008,
the impact of microfinance on several development indicators is investigated and
microfinance’s relevance for achieving MDGs is discussed. In order to do so, a
standard fixed-effects approach is utilized to study the impacts on a number of
variables e.g. fertility rate, child mortality, life expectancy at birth and children’s
schooling. The results indicate that microfinance explains 2 % of the decrease in fer-
tility, 6 % of the increase in life expectancy and 3 % of the decrease in child mortality
over the entire period. Further, no significant effects on children’s schooling are found.
This thesis also evaluates whether lending to women rather than men has additional
impact on development indicators. The study could not find any significant effect.
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1 Introduction
“Women can be agents of change if given greater economic opportunity”.1
Women are discriminated against in various ways, e.g. in health and schooling as
well as in the labor market, which leads to reduced opportunities for women.
In countries where the agriculture sector dominates, unskilled women have limited
opportunities outside the household and family owned farms where they usually are
unpaid workers. In addition, women constitute a large proportion of the population
in the informal sector, with little or no financial security and/or social benefits
(Human Development Report 2010). Sen (1992) writes about skewed population sex
ratios in developing countries and states that overall mortality for females is higher
than for males in these countries. Human Development Report (2010) uses the same
assumptions as Sen (1992) and reports that the number of missing2 women in 2010
is more than 134 millions. One reason for this type of discrimination is that women
are not considered an important source of income. They are rather viewed as a
burden for the family, in part due to dowry obligations.
According to United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) six out of ten of the
world’s poorest people are women. Haughton and Khandker (2009) define poverty
as following: “Poverty is pronounced deprivation in well-being, and comprises many
dimensions. It includes low incomes and the inability to acquire the basic goods and
services necessary for survival with dignity. Poverty also encompasses low levels of
health and education, poor access to clean water and sanitation, inadequate physical
security, lack of voice, and insufficient capacity and opportunity to better one’s
life”. Human Development report (2010) reports that 1.44 billion poor people are
living on less than $ 1.25 a day. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the percentage of
the population living under $ 1.25 a day in different regions of the world between
1981 to 2005. It illustrates that although extreme poverty rates have been declining
across many regions of the world in recent decades, high poverty rates still exist,
especially in South Asia and Sub Saharan Africa.
UNDP also reports that some 75 percent of the world’s women cannot get bank
loans because they have vulnerable3 or insecure jobs as well as a lack of collateral to
1UNDP (2010a), Human Development Report 2010, www.undp.org
2“those who died prematurely or who were selectively aborted”, Armendariz and Morduch
(2005)
3“Vulnerable employment is unpaid family workers and own-account workers as a percentage of
1
Figure 1: Percentage living below $1.25 a day, Source: Chen and Ravallion (2008)
offer as security to banks. See table 1 for an overview of the level of difficulty for a
woman to access loans in different countries.4
UNDP consider women’s empowerment as an important part of sustainable develop-
ment and reports that gender inequality in developing countries inhibits economic
growth and development. Gender equality and empowerment of women plus eradi-
cating poverty and hunger are two of the eight millenium development goals (MDGs)
that United Nations adopted in 2000. At the MDG Summit 2010,5 microfinance
was discussed as one of the pathways to obtain MDGs. MDGs will be described in
more details in section 2.1.
Extensive research has been done on micro level in order to examine the effects of
microfinance on poverty and welfare indicators as well as empowerment of women.
This thesis explores whether microfinance is so substantial that the effects also show
total employment”, World Bank (2010) www.worldbank.org
4“Women’s access to bank loans is an index that indicates whether women are allowed to and
can de facto have access to bank loans. In all cases, the variables are between 0 and 1. The value 0
means no or very low inequality and the value 1 indicates high inequality”. World Bank (2010)
5UNDP (2010b) MDG Summit Outcome Document, www.undp.org
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Table 1: Women’s access to bank loans (0=no restriction to 1=full restriction), 2009.
Source: Worldbank
Angola 0.2 Albania 0.5
United Arab Emirates 0 Argentina 0
Armenia 0 Benin 0
Burkina Faso 0.5 Bangladesh 0.3
Bulgaria 0 Bahrain 0
Bolivia 0.5 Brazil 0
Botswana 0.5 Central African Republic 0
Chad 0.7 Chile 0
China 0.2 Cote d’Ivoire 0
Cameroon 0.5 Colombia 0
Costa Rica 0 Cuba 0
Dominican Republic 0 Algeria 0.2
Ecuador 06 Egypt, Arab Rep. 0
Eritrea 0.5 Estonia 0
Ethiopia 0.5 Fiji 0.5
Ghana 0.5 Guinea 0
Equatorial Guinea 1 Honduras 0.3
Haiti 0 Indonesia 0.2
India 0.5 Iran, Islamic Rep. 0
Israel 0.2 Jordan 0
Kenya 0.7 Kuwait 0
Lebanon 0 Libya 0
Sri Lanka 0 Morocco 0.2
Madagascar 0 Mali 0.7
Malta 0 Myanmar 0
Mozambique 0.5 Mauritania 0.5
Mauritius 0 Malawi 0.5
Malaysia 0.2 Namibia 0.6
Niger 0.3 Nigeria 0.8
Nicaragua 0 Nepal 0.7
Oman 0 Pakistan 0.7
Panama 0 Peru 0.5
Philippines 0 Paraguay 0
Romania 0 Russian Federation 0.2
Saudi Arabia 0.8 Sudan 1
Senegal 0.5 El Salvador 0.1
Syrian Arab Republic 0.4 Togo 0.7
Thailand 0 Tanzania 0.8
Uganda 0.9 Ukraine 0
Vietnam 0.3 Yemen 0.5
South Africa 0.5 Zambia 0.7
Zimbabwe 0.7
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up in the aggregate. Using panel data on microfinance from 79 countries covering the
period 1995-2008, it will investigate the impact on several development indicators,
link the results to MDGs and thereafter suggest whether microfinance is an effective
strategy to achieve the MDGs. Whether the effect of microfinance is larger when
lending to women rather than men is also examined. Using Stata 11, a standard
fixed-effects approach is employed to study the impacts of microfinance’s coverage
on fertility rate, child mortality, life expectancy at birth and children’s schooling.
A detailed description of these development indicators as well as the fixed-effects
approach will be explained in section 4.
If positive effects on the aggregate is found, it underlines the importance of credit
constraints on human development, especially the credit constraints on women, and
thereby also the importance of equal economic opportunities for men and women.
The outline of the thesis is as follows: Section 2 provides a background discussion
of MDGs and microfinance. Section 3 gives a survey of previous literature on
microfinance in relation to the contribution of microfinance to achieve MDGs.
Section 4 presents the data and the econometric specification before the empirical
results are discussed in section 5. Effects that are not captured in the model are
discussed in section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
4
2 Background
Microfinance increases opportunities for poor people by helping them to access
credit. The formal financial sector usually does not offer financial services to poor
people. The main reason why banks do not find poor people credit-worthy is lack
of collateral as well as lack of information6. Even though poor people may have
project ideas that give high expected returns, the risks of lending to poor people
is often considered too high. In order to reduce the risk many MFIs offer loans to
groups of micro entrepreneurs. Members of the groups are mutually responsible for
repaying the loans which leads to self-monitoring within the group and make each
member to work hard to succeed.
2.1 Millenium Development Goals
“The MDGs provide a basic roadmap for development. Gender equality is the third
goal, but it is also integral to achieving all eight MDGs, from preventing the spread
of HIV to sustaining the environment in the face of climate change”7.
In September 2000, world leaders came together at United Nations Headquarters in
New York to adopt the United Nations Millennium Declaration. The eight goals
adopted by the international community are as follows:
MDG1: End Poverty and Hunger
MDG2: Universal Education
MDG3: Gender Equality
MDG4: Child Health
MDG5: Maternal Health
MDG6: Combat HIV/AIDS
MDG7: Environmental Sustainability
MDG8: Global Partnership
All eight MDGs are targeted to meet poor people’s needs and are set to be achieved
within 2015. At the UN Summit on the MDGs 2010, Heads of State and Government
appraised the progress made related to MDGs since their last meeting in 2005, but
they also expressed their concern that this development is not enough for what is
6Moral hazard problem: Banks are unable to ensure whether customers are making full effort
for their investment projects.
7UNWomen (2011) www.unwomen.org
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needed to achieve the goals by the 2015 target date. UNDP reports that the child
mortality (MDG 4) has been reduced, but not enough to reach the target, while
maternal mortality (MDG 5) remains high in much of the developing world. The UN
Summit 2010 announced new commitments for women’s and children’s health and
other actions against poverty, hunger and disease. Ines Albredi, UNIFEM Executive
director, held a speech at the UN Summit 2010, while emphasizing the importance
of women empowerment and women entrepreneurs. “...Women who have lost their
jobs and are unable to find new ones are exploring entrepreneurial possibilities in
an effort to maintain a livelihood. Credit access is essential if they are to have any
hope of success” (Albredi, 2010).
The MDG Summit Outcome Document8 reports that the following elements about
microfinance were included on the agenda for UNDP to obtain MDGs:
MDG1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
Facilitating access by women to affordable microfinance, in particular microcredit,
which can contribute to poverty eradication, gender equality and the empowerment
of women.
MDG3: Promoting Gender equality and empowerment of women
Promoting inclusive financial services, particularly microfinance and including af-
fordable and accessible credit, savings, insurance and payments products, for all
segments of society, especially women, people in vulnerable situations and those who
would not normally be served or are underserved by traditional financial enterprises.
2.2 Microfinance
There are numerous microfinance institutions (MFIs) worldwide offering financial
services to impoverished people, so they can start entrepreneurial activities and
become self-employed and independent. These activities could be to buy a buffalo,
start a local kiosk, buy a sewing machine, selling vegetables etc. Microfinance has
potential to be a road to new opportunities for a large number of people. In addition
to provide micro credit, microfinance programs may also offer organizational help,
training, safety nets and empowerment (Khandker, 2001).9 The main goal for most
8UNDP (2010b) www.undp.org. The outcome document for the MDG Summit 2010 includes
an action agenda for achieving the MDGs by 2015.
9Facilities and services beyond credit is discussed in section 2.2.2
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MFIs is to reach women and involve them in the development process.
Figure 2: Evolution of total borrowers and total female borrowers over the period
1995-2008 as reported by Mix Market
For generations, poor people with no land or assets have been borrowing from infor-
mal money lenders, mostly from the rich farmers, at very high interest rents. Thus,
informal savings and credit arrangements have existed for a long time, and the roots
of microfinance can be found in many places. The Grameen Bank is often considered
as the establisher of microcredit and was founded by Professor Muhammad Yunus
in Bangladesh in the middle of 1970s (Armendariz and Morduch, 2005). The bank
grew quickly and it now serves more than 7 million poor families with loans, savings,
insurances and other services (Grameen Bank). The microfinance sector is booming
in developing countries. Per 2009 number of active10 microfinance borrowers world-
wide was calculated to be around 92.4 millions where 20.6 millions of the borrowers
were from Bangladesh and 26.6 from India (Mix Market, 2010). Figure 2 shows the
growth of microfinance borrowers from 1995 to 2008 as reported by Mix Market.
10“Active borrowers refers to those who have active accounts with the organization; it would
exclude any prior clients or clients with long-dormant accounts”, in an email correspondence with
Scott Gaul, Mix Market
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Figure 3: Figure 2 without Bangladesh and India
Figure 3 shows the same evolution though excluding Bangladesh and India. The
gap between total borrowers and total female borrowers is remarkably bigger when
excluding Bangladesh and India. This indicates that the share of female borrowers
is larger in countries like Bangladesh and India that also have high prevalence of
microfinance. Anyhow, figure 2 shows that total female borrowers has grown fast
worldwide and started exceeding total male borrowers in late 90s. After 2001 most
of the evolution of total borrowers is explained by growth in total female borrowers.
2.2.1 Why Target Women?
A large number of MFIs target women, hence microfinance contribute in aiming
resources to women rather than men. Some, like the Self Employed Women’s As-
sociation (Sewa)11 in India only have female customers. In 2009 the percentage of
female borrowers at Grameen Bank was as high as 97 percent12.
11Sewa is a trade union registered in 1972. Sewa’s main goal is to organize women workers for
full employment. SEWA (2011) www.sewa.org
12These numbers are adapted from Grameen Foundation Annual Report 2009. Grameen-Bank
(2009) www.grameen.com
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The main reason for MFIs to prioritize women is the fact that women are considered
to be better customers. Women are often more reliable than men when it comes to
repayment of loans. The relation between gender and repayment of loans has been
analyzed in a number of studies. Khandker, Khalily, and Khan (1995) find that in
1994 9,7 percent of Grameen’s male borrowers were irregular and had difficulties
to pay before the due date, compared to only 3,7 percent of the women. Similarly,
Sharma and Zeller (1997) report that the default rate was reduced significantly in
Bangladesh, when the percentage of women increased. Kevane and Wydick (2001)
find in a study from Guatemala that female credit groups misused funds less often
and performed better than male groups.
Armendariz and Morduch (2005) discuss why women are better customers. They are
less mobile, thus more likely to work from home and this makes it easier for MFIs
to follow and monitor the investment projects. This argument is also discussed in
Goetz and Gupta (1996). Similarly Sharma and Zeller (1997) argue that women
are more conservative in their investment and business strategies which make them
choose projects that are less risky.
Another explanation for the rising proportion of female borrowers is that the so-
cioeconomic impacts of lending to women may be bigger. A number of previous
studies suggest that women care more about improving their families’ welfare and
nutrition, and thus deliver stronger development impacts. Soufias and McClafferty
(2001) argue that bigger social and economic impacts of microfinance by lending to
women can be explained by men’s habits to misuse the resources, probably through
tobacco, alcohol and gambling. Thomas (1990) finds an improvement in children’s
health and households’ nutrition when non-labor income is in the hands of women
rather than men. Similarly Schultz (1990) finds that the fertility rate in Thailand
tends to decline when women are the heads of non-labor income. Thomas (1994)
reports that the budget share spent on households’ health and education in Brazil
increases when the bargaining power of women is increased13.
2.2.2 Services Beyond Credit
Credit is the most common service that MFIs provide. As stated earlier in this
section, MFIs also provide other services such as savings, insurances, micro leasing
13See Khandker (2005) and Pitt and Khandker (1998) for more
9
of income generating objects, education loans etc.
In order to succeed as entrepreneurs basic entrepreneurial skills are needed (Khand-
ker, 2001). Poor people that are unable to read or write and have never owned
businesses may lack such skills. Therefore, to succeed as micro entrepreneurs, basic
entrepreneurial education may be crucial. Gray and Karlan (2006)14 emphasize the
importance of entrepreneurial skills by measuring the impact of business education.
Clients receiving only financial services and clients receiving added business training
were followed over a period of two years. The results indicate increased revenues
during bad periods for clients that received financial services and business education.
Gray and Karlan (2006) conclude that by receiving added business training clients
are able to smooth their income through good and bad economic periods.
There are already many MFIs and organizations that offer facilities and services
beyond credit and design the product to better meet the poor clients’ needs. Some
few examples are Brac, Basix and Freedom from Hunger. Brac in Bangladesh offer
services in the areas of e.g. education and health, economic and social empowerment
and livelihood training in order to help poor out of poverty.15. Basix in India provides
savings and insurance services for the less enterprising poor people and Agricultural/
Business Development Services16 to poor people in backward regions to better meet
their needs.17. Freedom from Hunger offer microfinance with education that consist
of group meetings for better health, nutrition, business and money management.18
14The study was carried out with Freedom from Hunger’s partners FINCA-Peru and Innovations
for Poverty Action.
15BRAC (2011) www.brac.net
16These services consist of productivity enhancement, risk mitigation, local value addition, and
market linkages
17BASIX (2011): www.basixindia.com
18Freedom From Hunger (2011) www.freedomfromhunger.org
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3 Review of Impact Studies
Extensive research has been done on micro level to examine the impacts of microfi-
nance. Unfortunately, impact assessments of microfinance on aggregate level are yet
limited. Estimating the effects on aggregate level is discussed more in detail in a
later section.
3.1 Methodology
Different approaches and methods have been used to study the impact of microfi-
nance at participant and village level. Non-randomness in program participation
and non-randomness in program placement are two main estimation problems that
researchers have dealt with, when computing effects of microfinance. Tedeschi (2008)
reports that selection is a substantial problem and finds that those who eventually
will become borrowers have higher incomes than those who will not become bor-
rowers. Consequently, program assessments that are based on simple comparisons
between participants and non participants are likely to be biased. Non-randomness
in program placement leads to selection bias when estimating, because microfinance
institutions do not randomize when they choose area for the programs. Upward
biases occur when programs choose areas that are already doing well, and downward
biases when programs are placed in less advantaged regions. In addition, selection of
villages are often based on characteristics that may not be observable for researchers
(Berhane and Gardebroek, 2009).
One of the earliest studies that instrument non-random program placement and
non-random program participant is Pitt and Khandker (1998). The study is a
collaboration between Bangladesh Institute for Development Studies (BIDS) and
the World Bank, which investigates impacts of three different credit programs19
on household expenditure, non-land assets held by women, male and female labor
supply, and boys’ and girls’ schooling in Bangladesh. They use cross-sectional data
and deal with selection problem using quasi-experimental methods and generate
control and treatment groups.
Furthermore, cross-sectional studies are often subject to bias because these ap-
proaches assume that the initial conditions of control and experiment areas are
19Grameen Bank, the Bangladesh rural Advancement Committee, and the Bangladesh Rural
Development Board’s RD-12 program
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identical. Another problem is the difficulty of introducing strong and valid in-
strumental variables (Berhane and Gardebroek, 2009). Copestake, Bhalotra, and
Johnson (2001), Khandker (2005), Tedeschi (2008) and Berhane and Gardebroek
(2009) use panel data to deal with biases that occur in cross-sectional studies.
They use difference-in-difference and fixed-effects methods to evaluate the impact
of microfinance. The results vary across these studies and are presented in the
next subsection. See also Khandker (1998b) for an analysis of the methodologies
employed to evaluate microcredit programs
3.2 Relevance of Microfinance on MDGs
There is limited literature that shows a direct link between microfinance and MDGS.
Dunford (2006) and Littlefield, Hashemi, and Morduch (2003) provide a good ba-
sis by discussing the articles that show evidence of microfinance’s contribution to
reach the MDGs. The following discussion on the relevance of microfinance for
MDGs is based on these two articles, as well as results from other articles of relevance.
3.2.1 Effect on Poverty
Pitt and Khandker (1998) suggest that the presence of microfinance programs helps
the poor to build more assets and net worth. Morduch (1998) criticizes the findings
by Pitt and Khandker (1998) by using the same BIDS-survey data of nearly 1800
households he concludes that results by Pitt and Khandker are overestimated and
that programs such as Grameen Bank does not really benefit the poor. Morduch
(1998) reports that households that are eligible to borrow and have access to microfi-
nance programs do not have remarkably higher consumption than the control groups.
Khandker (2001) argues that whether microfinance helps the poor, depends on the
definition of poverty and what kind of microfinance programs are available for the
poor. Khandker further states that success in business depends on entrepreneurial
skills and local economic conditions. Since many poor people may lack such skills,
they may benefit very little from their participation in microfinance programs. Fur-
thermore, Khandker identifies the participants of a microfinance program and their
characteristics and then assess the short-term and long-term impacts of microfinance
on aggregate welfare. Results indicate that some time after lending, the poor partic-
ipants do have higher consumption, income as well as net worth. He further shows
12
that the socioeconomic impacts are positive for households that participate in the
programs as well as for non-participating households and concludes that involvement
in microfinance also leads to a positive but small welfare impact on the local economy.
Khandker (2005) studies the effect of microfinance on participant and aggregate
level using panel data in Bangladesh.20 He suggests that microfinance contributes
to poverty reduction, especially for female participants: each 100 additional taka
that was borrowed to women increased the total annual household expenditures by
more than 20 taka. He also reports significant effects on overall poverty reduction
at the village-level, both for participating and non-participating households.
Copestake, Bhalotra, and Johnson (2001) use data of urban credit program in Zam-
bia and find higher growth on business profits and household income for microfinance
borrowers, compared to non-borrowers (otherwise similar business operators). They
also find that some borrowers were worse off financially after borrowing, 50 percent
or so were those who only borrowed once.
Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, and Kinnan (2009) examine what happens when
microcredit becomes available in a new market. They follow the startup of new MFI
in Hyderabad in India and study the effects on the creation and the profitability of
small businesses, investment, and consumption. After 15-18 months, they find that
microcredit has an important effect on business outcome and household expenditure,
though the effects are heterogeneous for the participants. The paper reports a
decrease in non-durable consumption for new business-starters in order to pay a
fixed cost to enter entrepreneurship. Households that were already involved in
businesses invest more in durable goods and increase their profit. The findings
also suggest an increase in non-durable spending for households who were not in a
position to become entrepreneurs. Moreover, authors find no socioeconomic impacts
on health, education or women’s empowerment.
Berhane and Gardebroek (2009) use panel data from 16 villages in Northeren
Ethiopia covering the period 1997-2006 to test the impact of microfinance. They use
standard fixed-effects approach and random trend model and suggest positive effects
on annual household per capita consumption and housing improvements. Results
from fixed and trend deviate somewhat, but they all indicate improved welfare.
20Panel data consisted of 1,638 households in two waves of the BIDS and World Bank 1991/92
and 1998/99 survey in Bangladesh.
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Repeat borrowing also matter in both cases and consequently, they suggest that
impact evaluations that do not account for long run effect may underestimate the
effect of microfinance.
Tedeschi (2008) tests the impact of micro credit on microenterprise profit using a
panel data set on a MFI from Peru. He employs fixed-effects and quasi-experimental
cross-section methods to mitigate selection bias and finds that microentrepreneurs
who take loans make higher profits on average than entrepreneurs who do not bor-
row. Fixed-effects estimates give roughly the same results as the quasi-experimental
cross-selection analysis.
Fixed-effects approach accounts for time-invariant individual and area/village unob-
servables. Fixed-effects method is used in this study and is explained in more detail
in section 4.3.
3.2.2 Effect on Health
There are not many studies that have examined whether extra income gained through
microfinance improves health and nutritional outcomes among household members.
Illness may lead to loss of earnings which may effect the entire household. Access
to loans make these people able to seek health care services. Some microfinance
programs even offer education on basic health issues.
Mohindra, Haddad, and Narayana (2008) examine the relationship between female
participation in a microcredit program in India, called Self Help Groups (SHGs),
and women’s health.21 The main finding from the study is that participation in
SHG may help poor women with not being excluded from health care. Further,
Hamad and Fernald (2010) investigate relationship between longer participation in
microcredit services and better nutritional status in women in Peru. This study
supports the hypothesis that microcredit participation has positive effects on the
dietary status of female clients.
Pitt and Khandker (1998), Thomas (1990), Thomas (1994) and Khandker (1998a)
also report that microfinance has positive effect on health issues. Furthermore, there
are also some few studies that were not able to find any impact on health, e.g.
21The study was carried out in the south Indian state of Kerala and included information on
928 non elderly poor women.
14
Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, and Kinnan (2009)
3.2.3 Effect on Education
Access to credit widens opportunities for many poor people, which again may result
in increased income. This extra income allows poor people to invest in their chil-
dren’s education and a better future.
Impact assessment of microfinance on children’s schooling is not extensive. Yet there
have been some studies measuring this impact. Khandker (1998a) finds significant
impact on children’s schooling, especially for boys. Khandker suggests that a 1
percent increase in Grameen Bank credit provided to women at the mean level,
increases the probability of joining school by 1.9 percent for girls and 2.4 percent for
boys. Pitt and Khandker (1998) find similar positive effects on children’s schooling.
Moreover, Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, and Kinnan (2009) and Morduch (1998)
find no socioeconomic impacts on education.
3.2.4 Effect on Women
A number of studies find that socioeconomic effects of microfinance are larger for
women. Pitt and Khandker (1998) investigate whether women benefit from partici-
pation in microfinance programs. Findings indicate that women who participate
in the programs are more actively involved in decision making in households and
they also obtain their own assets. Similarly, Khandker (2005) and Hossain (1988)
report that presence of microfinance has been a benefit for women in terms of social
development and poverty reduction.
Somewhat different but interesting relevant research is done by Dupas and Robinson
(2009), who focuse on the role of access to formal saving services rather than credit.
This study is a field experiment from rural Kenya where self-employed people were
randomly selected and given access to bank accounts with no interest. The bank
charged large withdrawal fees which implied that interest rate on the account became
negative. Nonetheless, the usage of the account was high, particularly among women.
Findings indicated a positive impact on levels of productive investments among
entrepreneurial women, and led to higher income levels within six months.
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4 Estimating Impact on the Aggregate
This paper investigates whether the suggested positive effects of microfinance are so
substantial that they also show up in the aggregate. Motivation to assess the impacts
on poverty and aggregate welfare mainly comes from United Nation’s commitment
to achieve MDGs within 2015. Firstly, the impact on several development indicators
are examined, and the results are linked to the MDGs. Secondly, the paper will
suggest whether microfinance is an effective strategy to achieve the MDGs. Lastly,
it is explored whether the effects of microfinance are greater when lending to men
rather than women.
4.1 Data
The data on microfinance is collected from Mix Market which is a large database
for microfinance programs. Most of the largest and well-known MFIs report to Mix
Market.
The following data on microfinance has been selected: total active borrowers22, and
share of female borrowers23. This data covers the period 1995 to 2008 and shows
the trend in microfinance borrowers in 79 countries. Some countries are excluded
from the sample due to missing data. It is assumed that this data is representative
for the evolution of microfinance even if it does not cover all the MFIs worldwide.
See table 9 in appendix for the list of the countries of interest. Most of the countries
are developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
Several types of data would be interesting to include in the model, but it is unavail-
able to us. Considering that we are interested in analyzing the effect of microfinance
on development indicators, it would be appropriate to include data on e.g. vulnerable
employment, literacy rate and poverty indexes such as people who live under $ 1,25
a day. The problem is that data is not collected in the relevant time periods and
too much data is missing. The data in the sample is selected due to availability of
an adequate amount of data on the countries of interest, over the preferred time
period. The data remains unbalanced.
22As stated earlier in section 2.2, active borrowers refer to those who have active accounts with
the organization; it would exclude any prior clients or clients with long-dormant accounts
23Share of female borrowers is calculated by dividing number of total female borrowers on total
borrowers.
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The thesis is assessing the impact of microfinance on several development indicators
as listed and described below. This data is collected from World Development
Indicators (WDI) which is the primary World Bank database for development data
from officially-recognized international sources.
4.1.1 Description of Data
The dependent variables are as follows:
Fertility rate, total (births per woman) (’fertility’)
“Total fertility rate represents the number of children that would be born to a woman if
she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance
with current age-specific fertility rates”.
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) (’life-expectancy’)
‘Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live
if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same
throughout its life”.
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000) (’mortality’)
“Under-five mortality rate is the probability per 1,000 that a newborn baby will die
before reaching age five, if subject to current age-specific mortality rates”.
Primary completion rate, female/male (% of relevant age group) (’school-
comlete-fem/male’)
“Primary completion rate is the percentage of students completing the last year of
primary school. It is calculated by taking the total number of students in the last
grade of primary school, minus the number of repeaters in that grade, divided by the
total number of children of official graduation age”.
School enrollment, primary, female/male (% gross) (’school-enrol-male/fem’)
“Gross enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the popu-
lation of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of education shown.
Primary education provides children with basic reading, writing, and mathematics
skills along with an elementary understanding of such subjects as history, geography,
natural science, social science, art, and music”.
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One control variable is added:
GDP per capita, PPP (current international $) (’gdppc’)
“GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GDP is gross domestic
product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An
international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar
has in the United States. GDP at purchaser’s prices is the sum of gross value added
by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any
subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making
deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of
natural resources”.
Table 2 and 3 present descriptive statistics of the explained and the explanatory
variables for 1999 and 2008 respectively. These years are included in order to observe
development of the variables since MFIs started to establish in 1995. The tables
show huge increment in the mean for total borrowers as well as GDP per capita.
Column 3 and 4 in both tables indicate large variation across countries in all the
variables observed. Share of female borrowers is however not as expected. Due to
table 2 and 3 the mean for the share of female borrowers has decreased over time.
Considering that many of the large MFIs have been focusing on women the last years
the share of female borrowers should have been higher. As mentioned in section 2.2
the share of female borrowers is largest in countries like India and Bangladesh who
also have the highest amount of total borrowers. Thus, the overall share of female
worldwide is more than half, but the lower share of female borrowers in the rest of
the countries decreases the mean. Otherwise, the rest of the variables are as expected.
Column 5 in table 2 and 3 show that the data is unbalanced for many of the variables,
especially for the variables related to schooling.
4.2 Complications
Microfinance mostly support the informal sector. Because this sector is difficult to
document, it is problematic to estimate its impacts. Hence estimations produced in
this thesis could be biased due to lack of information and should be viewed criti-
cally. In addition, amounts of loans may be so small that entrepreneurial activities
generated by micro loans may not give high enough returns to make an impact on
aggregate poverty (Khandker, 2005). Thus, the loans provided to the poor people
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Table 2: Descriptive statisitics of the dependent and independent variables in year
1995. GDP per capita in 100 international $
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Total borrowers 38.81 344.95 0 3066 79
Share of female borrowers 1 1 1 1 1
GDP per capita 2874.41 2821.09 286.12 16763.88 76
Fertility rate, total (births per woman) 4.09 1.81 1.23 8.05 79
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1000) 92.04 69.73 8.80 273.80 79
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 61.81 10.21 29.10 77.45 79
School enrollment, primary, male (% gross) 92.48 21.61 33.89 124.25 58
School enrollment, primary, female (% gross) 83.12 28.18 21.38 123.94 58
Primary completion rate, male 63.45 27.75 16.83 98.33 34
(% of relevant age group)
Primary completion rate, female 57.83 32.83 6.43 99.54 34
(% of relevant age group)
Table 3: Descriptive statisitics of the dependent and independent variables in year
2008. GDP per capita in 100 international $
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Total borrowers 1023909 3216964 0 22100000 79
Share of female borrowers .47 .25 0 .98 77
GDP per capita 6023.91 5946.57 316.39 27651.80 78
Fertility rate, total (births per woman) 3.37 1.57 1.35 7.12 79
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1000) 64.79 57.98 4.70 209 79
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 64.83 16.09 64.72 153.97 79
School enrollment, primary, male (% gross) 107.49 16.09 64.72 153.97 63
School enrollment, primary, female (% gross) 101.94 18.46 50.58 152.01 63
Primary completion rate, male 82.08 20.66 42.31 122.83 53
(% of relevant age group)
Primary completion rate, female 78.62 24.77 26.26 119.19 53
(% of relevant age group)
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are so small that the possible impact on poverty and welfare indicators might be
small or negligible.
It is also important to pay attention to deficiency in the data set. The effects may
be underestimated since not all MFIs are presented in the data. It is not possible
to say how many MFIs that are not presented since none of them are required to
report themselves at Mix Market. But the acquired data represents the trend of
microfinance, making it possible to test the impacts on the aggregate. The effect of
microfinance estimated in this study may also be underestimated because we are
only testing for microfinance borrowers. MFIs also offer services such as savings that
may generate socioeconomic impacts. This is not addressed in the present study.
This paper only addresses the impact of microfinance through the total number of
active borrowers.
4.3 Econometric Approach
In this thesis, a linear estimator with country fixed-effects is employed. We have a set
of countries (i = 1,..., 79), each of whom is measured over a period t (t = 1995,..2008).
Fixed-effects models make it possible to control for unobserved and unmeasured
variables by creating a dummy for each country and omitting the standard inter-
cept. Fixed-effects method can then be easily implemented using ordinary least
squares (OLS) linear regression. Creating country specific intercepts mitigates many
problems with omitted variable bias, since any unobserved characteristics which
are persistent for the country through the time series will be controlled for, e.g.
institutions, culture, religion etc. In a fixed effect model, the fixed unobserved
variables are allowed to be correlated with the observed variables.
This is equal to estimating a linear regression on the differences in the variation
from year to year. Thus, we are making comparisons within countries, and then
averaging those differences across all the countries in the sample. With the fixed
effects method, we compare only changes over time, not levels.
The basic model is:
Yit = α + β1borrowersit + β2sharefemit + vi + dt + eit (1)
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Y is a set of the seven dependent variables. Y= {fertility, mortality, life-expectancy,
school-enrol-male, school-enrol-fem, school-complete-male and school-complete-fem}.
β1 is the estimated impact of the number of total microfinance borrowers (borrowers)
on the dependent variables. β2 is the estimated impact of share of female borrowers
(sharefem) on the dependent variables. We are interested in seeing how the variable,
’sharefem’ affect the results. In this way, we can see if lending to women gives extra
impact on the development indicators. The term vi is the vector of country fixed
effects and eit is the error term.
The country fixed effect, vi, only varies across countries, not over time. It represents
the combined effect on Y of all unobserved variables that are constant over time.
Estimators of the parameters β1 and β2 of the fixed-effect models (1) must remove
the fixed-effects vi. This fixed-effects vi can be eliminated by subtracting the corre-
sponding model for country means Y it.
In addition to country fixed-effects, time dummies are included. dt is the time
specific effect for each period t but common for all countries, e.g. global economic
crisis, international political tensions etc. This means that the countries’ intercepts
can vary from year to year due to the time fixed-effects, but the yearly effect is equal
for all countries.
There is a different eit for each country for every year and represents random vari-
ation at each point in time. It is possible to imagine that this random error may
correlate with explanatory variables. Error term may suffer from heteroskedasticity,
e.g. if the variance of the error term increases as the total number of borrowers
increases. Intra-country correlation could be another problem, the error term for
country i in year t could be correlated with the error term for country i in the other
periods. Random shocks have effects that often persist over more than one time
period. Consider a policy change that affects the fertility rate in the following years.
If the effect of the shock reduces over time, it will not be captured in vi since it is
time-invariant, but instead be captured in the error term. Consequently, error terms
will be serially correlated. Anyhow, regressing OLS will not affect the estimated
coefficients, but it will bias the standard errors. Since it is likely that the errors are
correlated over time for a given country, cluster-robust standard errors that cluster
on the country are utilized.
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All regressions will include the control variable ’gdppc’. As explained in chapter 3.1,
selection bias is a substantial problem and leads to bias results when estimating
the effects of microfinance. Occurrence and placement of MFIs are not randomized.
Most of the MFIs are placed in poor countries with low GDP per capita. These
countries often have relatively low economic and social development over time but
strong evolution of microfinance. This paper only looks at countries that have
some microfinance during the preferred time period. In this way the countries are
similar. Nevertheless, downward biases will occur if countries that have weaker
social development also have the highest growth in microfinance. GDP per capita is
included to control for this selection bias. Effect of GDP per capita is not of interest
in this study, but it is important to include in the model since it most probably will
have an impact on the dependent variables.
The main model is:
Yit = α + β1borrowersit + β2sharefemit + β3gdppcit + vi + dt + eit (2)
The fixed-effects estimator is computed by using the xtreg command with fe and
vce(robust) option on Stata 11. The results are presented in the following section.24
24Test regressions were also run comparing fixed-effects regressions with OLS results. Results
from OLS regressions are greater for both the variable ’borrowers’ and ’gdppc’ on all the dependent
variables. These larger effects from OLS regressions may be due to omitted variables, both
unobserved and unmeasured country specific variables that are constant over time. Cross sectional
based analysis is not able to control away country-specific factors. Considering that fixed-effects
analysis reduce risk of omitted variable bias it was decided to only employ fixed-effects methods.
OLS results are not presented in this study.
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5 Empirical Results
It is of interest to assess the impact of ’borrowers’ as well as ’sharefem’. The sample
of data that include the variable ’sharefem’ is remarkably smaller than our full data
with 79 countries over 14 years and 1106 observations for the variable ’borrowers’.
’Sharefem’ amounts to 761 observations. This is due to small or no prevalence of
MFIs in the beginning of the period in the sample. Since many of the countries
did not have MFIs in the years 1995 to 1998, missing values were generated for the
variable ’sharefem’ for these observations. Consequently, this thesis tests whether
the effect of ’borrowers’ is remarkably different by regressing equation (2) without
’sharefem’ using two different data sets. One with the full sample and one that
only includes observations in years where ’sharefem’ is non-missing. The latter
sample will be referred to as the small sample from now on. Running regressions
on both datasets, whether the small sample is representative for the big set is
tested. The results are presented in table 4, table 5 and table 6. The estimates of
’borrowers’ is quite similar in both sets for most of the dependent variables. Impacts
are somewhat lower when using the small sample and impact on child mortality
becomes insignificant. This may be due to insufficiency of the small sample. In
order to not loose too much information, the focus will be on the full data when
assessing the effect of ’borrowers’. Furthermore, in section 5.3, regressions on the
small sample will be done making it possible to compare the effects of ’borrowers’
and ’sharefem’.
All the results presented in this study provide standard errors that are adjusted for
clustering.
5.1 Impact on Fertility, Child Mortality and Life Expectancy
Column 1 in table 4 shows the result of regressing equation (2) on our first dependent
variable ’life-expectancy’. Per 100 000 increase in the mean level of microfinance
borrowers life expectancy at birth increases with 0,0184 years. Descriptive tables
2 and 3 show that mean of life expectancy increased with 3 years over the total
period and the mean of microfinance borrowers increased with about one million.
This means that microfinance borrowers make out 6 percent25 of the total increase
in life expectancy.
25This is calculated by multiplying 0,0184 with 10 and dividing the product on 3. Similar
calculations are done for rest of the estimates in this section.
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Moreover, positive and significant effects on the ’fertility’ are found (Table 4, column
3). The results indicate that an increase in microfinance borrowers reduces the
fertility rate. At the mean, a 100 000 increase in microfinance borrowers leads to
0,00129 reduction in ’fertility’. 0,7 is the total reduction in the mean of fertility,
according to table 2 and 3. Hence, microfinance explains 2 percent of the total
reduction in fertility over the period 1995 to 2008.
Furthermore, this study finds significant effect of microfinance borrowers on the
’mortality’ (Table 4, column 5). The results indicate 0,0817 reduction in mortality,
when number of borrowers increase with 100 000 at the mean. Total reduction
in probability per 1000 in child mortality over the entire period is 27,5. Hence 3
percent of the reduction is explained with microfinance borrowers. Table 4 also shows
that the number of observations for ’mortality’ is much lower than for the other
variables. Despite the fact that the data for the ’mortality’ is highly unbalanced,
it was included in the study because of the relevance to MDGs and the interest to
assess whether microfinance has any impact on child mortality. We need to keep in
mind that the unbalanced data for the dependent variables may lead to insignificant
estimates. For ’mortality’ most of the missing values are in the first five years of
the sample and mostly random. This means that the length of the time period is
shortened even further and we have lost some information.
Fertility rate, child mortality rate and life expectancy are interesting factors to
assess due to a number of reasons. Lower fertility rates, higher life expectancy, and
lower child mortality can be linked to many of the MDGs. Lower child mortality is
directly captured by MDG 4 and MDG 5. Lower child mortality can be explained
by greater expenditure on the food and the health care of the children (Eswaran,
2002). This indicates that microfinance gives extra income that may be used for
health and better nutrition.
Increased life expectancy is generally a result of better nourishment and better
health care.26 The mechanism between microfinance and higher life expectancy
at birth may be explained by the fact that possible higher income gained through
involvement in microfinance leads to better nourishment and more frequent visits
26See Weil (2009) for evidence on the relationship between better nourishment and higher life
expectancy. Weil shows that as people become richer, they get better food and more resistant to
disease. Additionally, they also get better living standards through improvements in housing and
more frequent washing of clothes etc.
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to the doctor. This may again lead to higher life expectancy through higher living
standards. Hence, according to my estimates, microfinance does increase health and
as a result contribute to reach MDGs.
Low fertility is a desired scenario in many developing countries. Kravdal (2002)
highlights some of the reasons for why low fertility is preferred. “Parents may
suffer from having many children, and growing up with many siblings may be
determinant to the children’s well being. In addition, large families may contribute
to burden on other families because of the possibly harmful social effects of pop-
ulation growth” (Kravdal, 2002). Lower fertility rates can be linked to MDG 1
by explaining the mechanism through improved household earnings.27 Given that
children are considered as an income source for the family, when a household be-
comes richer the extra income gained from the child labor may not be necessary
for the household and consequently a family might want less children. This can be
an indication of graduating out of poverty and thus contribute in achieving MDG 1.28
In addition, decline in both child mortality and fertility may be linked to MDG
3. Extensive research has shown the relationship between women’s autonomy and
decline in both fertility and child mortality. Eswaran (2002) investigates this re-
lationship in developing countries. Eswaran demonstrates that the empowerment
of women through increased bargaining power of wives relative to their husbands
results in lower fertility and child mortality. Furthermore, Woldemicael and Tenko-
rang (2010) show that women in Ethiopia that are more independent are more
likely to seek health care during pregnancy and delivery than those with lower
autonomy.29 Relying on this evidence, results of decreasing fertility and child mor-
tality from this study are indications of women’s empowerment through microfinance.
5.2 Impact on Schooling
Variables ’school-enrol-male’ and ’school-enrol-fem’ are added to investigate whether
microfinance can contribute to children’s education, and also to be able to compare
differences between schooling for male and female children. Variables ’school-
complete-male’ and ’school-complete-fem’ are added to see if microfinance has an
effect on whether the children complete their primary education. It is interesting to
27Bloom and Finlay (2009) show the relationship between higher income and lower fertility.
28This relationship is also explained in Weil (2009)
29See also Bloom, Wypij, and Das Gupta (2001) for more evidence.
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Table 5: Regression on ’school-enrol-male/fem’ with full and small sample. ’Borrow-
ers’ in 100 000 persons, ’gdppc’ in 100 international $
(1) (2) (3) (4)
full sample small sample full sample small sample
school-enrol-male school-enrol-male school-enrol-fem school-enrol-fem
borrowers -0.0940 -0.0620 -0.0282 -0.00662
(.0875) (.0763) (.1112) .0996)
gdppc -0.247*** -0.251*** -0.307*** -0.308***
(.07) (.06) (.07) (.06)
constant 101.4*** 107.4*** 94.43*** 93.97***
(2.260) (1.883) (2.332) (2.410)
N 894 659 894 659
Std. error in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 6: Regression on ’school-complete-male/fem’ with full and small sample.
’Borrowers’ in 100 000 persons, ’gdppc’ in 100 international $
(1) (2) (3) (4)
full sample small sample full sample small sample
school-enrol-male school-enrol-male school-enrol-fem school-enrol-fem
borrowers -0.0432 -0.0440 -0.00476 -0.00584
(.0443) (.0462) (.0725) (.0758)
gdppc -0.160** -0.168** -0.177*** -0.204**
(.05) (.06) (.05) (.06)
constant 70.97*** 82.45*** 67.64*** 70.78***
(2.026) (2.090) (1.773) (2.612)
N 726 561 726 561
Std. error in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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investigate this factor because parents are more likely to take their children out of
school when extra income is needed in the household.
Table 5 and table 6 show the results on school dependent variables. Results indicate
no significant effect of ’borrowers’ on any of the schooling variables.
The time period of the data is worth concern. 14 years may be too short to estimate
the effects of microfinance on socioeconomic variables, such as schooling. If the
household is relying on income earned through children, the extra income gained
after participating in microfinance programs needs to be sufficiently higher, as the
household is no longer dependent on child labor income. To earn sufficient income
that covers the cost of sending their children to school and to cover the income
gap from the loss of child labor may take some time, maybe many years for some
households. The mindsets of parents also need to be changed so they are aware of
the positive effects of investing in children’s education.
5.3 Effects of the Borrower Being a Woman
As stated in the beginning of this section, regressions are now run on equation (2)
using the small sample, in order to assess the impact of a borrower being female.
The results are presented in table 7 for the impact on ’fertility’, ’mortality’ and
’life-expectancy’. Results for school related dependent variables are presented in
table 8. In comparison to ’borrowers’, the effect of the borrowers being women has
no significant effect on any of the dependent variables. This can be due to the loss of
information in the small sample. Extracting a balanced panel out of an unbalanced
data set leads to a substantial loss of efficiency. Hence, given the data set available,
it is not possible to tell whether lending to a woman rather than a man generate
higher socioeconomic impacts and whether they contribute more to achieve MDGs
within 2015.
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Table 7: Regression on ’fertility’, ’mortality’ and ’life-expectancy’ with small sample.
’Borrowers’ in 100 000 persons, ’gdppc’ in 100 international $
(1) (2) (3)
fertilty mortality life-expectancy
(births per woman) (per 1000) (years)
borrowers -0.00121** -0.0212 0.0120**
(.0004) (2.800) (.0042)
sharefem -0.0454 -0.779 0.529
(.0354) (.0006) (.3362)
gdppc 0.0077*** 0.204*** -0.0110
(.002) (.06) (.007)
constant 3.947*** 93.55*** 61.34***
(.0468) (3.313) (.2733)
N 747 365 748
Std. errors in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 8: Regression on ’school-enrol-male/fem’ and ’school-complete-male/fem’ with
small sample. ’Borrowers’ in 100 000 persons, ’gdppc’ in 100 international $
(1) (2) (3) (4)
school-enrol-male school-enrol-fem school-complete-male school-complete-fem
borrowers -0.0622 -0.00630 -0.0439 -0.00630
(.0763) (.0996) (.04622) (.0996)
sharefem 0.232 -0.404 -0.381 -0.404
(2.227) (2.537) (1.683) (2.536)
gdppc -0.251*** -0.309*** -0.169** -0.309***
(.056) (.06) (.06) (.06)
onstant 107.2*** 94.23*** 82.70*** 94.23***
(2.3510) (2.876) (2.432) (2.876)
N 659 659 561 659
Std. errors in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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5.4 Robustness Tests
In addition to ’gdppc’ the control variables ’rural-population’ and ’population-growth’
are now included. Rural population (% of total population) and population growth
(annual %) are both collected from World bank on-line database. Percentage of rural
population is added as a control variable for level of development. Microfinance
is often more prevailing in rural areas and socioeconomic factors such as health
and schooling also tend to be lower in rural areas. Further, population growth
is included because it may also affect socioeconomic development. The estimates
changed only marginally. Effect of total borrowers on mortality rate becomes in-
significant when the control variables ’population-growth’ and ’rural-population’ are
added. Effect on fertility is now significant at the 10 % level compared to 5 % with
only GDP per capita as control variable. However, neither ’population-growth’ nor
’rural-population’ have any statistically significant effect on any of the dependent
variables.30
Further, GDP per capita has unexpected impact on all the dependent variables. GDP
per capita has statistically significant, negative effect on children’s schooling (table
5 and table 6). Furthermore, the findings suggest that GDP per capita increases
fertility and child mortality. These results are also statistically significant (column 3
and 5, table 4). Moreover, impact on life expectancy is not statistically significant
(column 1, table 4). These unexpected opposite effects may be explained by the
fact that the time period in this study is too short to capture any positive effect on
development indicators. The effect of GDP per capita is, however, not of interest
in this study. Considering that the impact of GDP per capita on the dependent
variables is contradicting to what was expected, several tests are undertaken to
examine whether the results are robust when extending the regression model in
various ways.
One possible explanation for the unxpected findings could be that there are some
countries with extreme values, such as very high GDP per capita over the period
but low level and development of socioeconomic factors, such as life expectancy
and schooling. This may be due to unequal distribution of income in the country.
Such values may draw the entire effect of GDP in opposite direction. Regressions
excluding the extreme values were therefore run to see whether the direction of
GDP’s impact changes. The results founded earlier were robust against this test.
30All the regressions in this subsection are carried out using the full sample, excluding the
analysis of the variable ’sharefem’.
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Regressions were also run for different regions testing whether the impact of GDP is
different in e.g. Africa and Asia. Effects of GDP on the dependent variables remain
opposite than expected.31
Further, regressions with interaction between GDP and dummy for positive GDP
growth were run to test whether the impact on development indicators is positive
when the growth of GDP is positive. The results do not change in any significant
manner. Moreover, the results do not change much even though GDP is the only
explanatory variable32, suggesting that the time period of 14 years is too short to see
positive effects of GDP on human development indicators. With longer time-series,
the empirical investigation would become more valid.
Ruhm (2005) and Tapia Granados and Ionides (2008) also find negative effects of
economic growth on health33. Ruhm (2005) argues that the long- and short-term
impacts of a rise in income may differ. He argues that even if a permanent rise in
income improves health, temporary growth could cause an increase in mortality. He
further discusses the possible reasons for pro-cyclical effect of income on mortality.
Ruhm(2005, cited in Tapia Granados and Ionides 2008) states the following to
explain the short-term negative effect of income on health: “Higher mortality during
temporary expansions need not imply negative effects of permanent growth. The
key distinction is that transitory increases in output usually require more intensive
use of labour and health inputs with existing technologies, whereas lasting changes
result from technological innovations or expansions in the capital stock that have
the potential to ameliorate any costs to health. Individuals are also more likely to
defer health investments during temporary than permanent increases in work hours
and sustained growth permits the purchase of consumption goods (like safer cars)
that benefit health”.
31However, impact of total borrowers became insignificant for almost all of the dependent
variables. That is probably because number of observations were too small for the specific regions.
32A test regression was run excluding ’borrowers’ as an explanatory variable.
33See See Ruhm (2000) and Ruhm (2003) for more.
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6 Effects not Captured in the Model
Microfinance may have positive effects on households’ income and other welfare
variables, but due to a lack of data it was not possible to measure impact on these
variables. As stated earlier, it is difficult to assess impact on many variables of
interest if these are generated in the informal sector. For example, even if this
paper does not find that microfinance leads to a higher schooling level, it is possible
to imagine that children who already go to school no longer will need to be an
income source for the family after school time. E.g. they do not have to work
part-time as shoe-shiners or wash dishes at the local restaurant. Hence, the number
of children that goes to school does not increase but children can focus more on
their education. This indirectly leads to more investment in education, but this is
difficult to document.
Another important factor not captured is the effect of microfinance on the growth
of small scale entrepreneurs in the informal sector. MFIs mainly support and lend
credit to poor and eligible people who have potential to be entrepreneurs. It is
likely to assume that many of these newcomers, especially in the informal sector
never register their business. Thus, it is difficult to estimate this effect. This is
unfortunate because successive business ventures create jobs for other poor people,
which also remains undocumented. Ines Albredi, UNIFEM Executive Director,
emphasizes the positive spillover effects of these entrepreneurs in a speech held
at UN Summit on the Millennium Development Goals 2010: “...the links between
successful entrepreneurship and job creation, as todays’ struggling entrepreneurs
become tomorrows’ employers” (Albredi, 2010).
An additional effect of microfinance that is difficult to measure is the effect of people
who borrow small amounts from MFIs in periods of shocks on household income and
consumption. The shocks could be due to illness or too much rainfall that destroys
the harvest etc. If the person who brings the main income to the household falls ill,
it is better to take a micro loan and receive instant health care in order to recover
faster and thus return faster to work. Freedom From Hunger34 illustrates this with
an example of a working woman with a sick child that prevents her from earning
money for days, or weeks. Without microfinance people in such conditions without
proper security schemes may lose their income, job or income-generating assets, such
as a cow or a sewing machine. Hence, access to micro loans in periods of shocks may
34Freedom From Hunger (2011). Financial education to protect and empower women.
www.freedomfromhunger.org
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lead to more smooth income and consumption. This is an effect of microfinance that
has not been assessed in this study due to lack of adequate data. It is not measured
by any of the dependent variables in this study.
Furthermore, microfinance loans may be invested in non-profit projects such as
better isolation of the house or a new roof. Such projects do not generate any instant
income or profit for the poor, but it can help the poor prohibit extra costs in the
future. Investing in better isolation may keep the family members warm during the
winter, which reduces the possibility of falling ill and loose valuable income.
By making credit and other financial services available for poor people microfinance
help developing a more equal credit marked. The poor, especially women who cannot
afford collateral are denied loans in traditional banks. These millions of women
who take loans with the ambition of becoming small-scale entrepreneurs should be
regarded as women with empowerment. Participation in a microfinance program
is a large step for many poor women, a step towards autonomy. Even though this
study could not find any significant effect of lending to women as opposed to men,
the fact that women actually use the opportunity of borrowing small loans deserves
to be characterized as empowerment and gender equality.
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7 Conclusions
This thesis evaluates the impact of microfinance on several development indicators
and investigates whether microfinance is an effective strategy to reach MDGs within
2015. Panel data from 79 countries covering the period 1995-2008 is used to assess
the effects of microfinance coverage on fertility rate, child mortality, life expectancy
at birth and children’s schooling.
The results confirm earlier findings at micro level that microfinance contributes to
poverty reduction. Results from this study indicate that microfinance explains 2
% of the decrease in fertility, 6 % of the increase in life expectancy and 3 % of the
decrease in child mortality over the entire period. However, no significant effects on
children’s schooling are found.
The thesis also examines whether the effects of microfinance are greater when lending
to women rather than men. No significant effects are found, which indicates that
gender does not matter. This result together with the positive impact of microfi-
nance on fertility, child mortality and life expectancy suggest that it is the access
of credit to the poor that is crucial, not whether the borrower is female or male.
These findings contradict with results from studies on micro/village level which
show that socioeconomic effects of lending to women are remarkably larger than
when lending to men. Moreover, positive effects found on the aggregate under-
lines the importance of credit constraints on human development, and especially
the credit constraints on women, since women constitute the largest share of the poor.
There is already extensive evidence on participant- and village level suggesting that
microfinance does alleviate poverty. Relying on this evidence and the positive results
on the aggregate level found in this study, one may conclude that microfinance
does contribute to achieve the MDGs. The effects of microfinance found in this
thesis are small, but they should not be neglected. Microfinance has the potential
to become an effective strategy to reach out to the majority of poor people. This
requires programs that are designed to meet their needs. Services beyond credit
may be crucial to involve poor people who are not even eligible for microcredit.
Some programs focus on awareness of the poor to broaden their minds. It is e.g.
important to provide knowledge to poor people about the positive long-term effects
of investing in children’s education as well as health. However, it is important to
bear in mind that microfinance is only one of the pathways to achieve MDGs. Policy
34
makers should take into account the positive effects of microfinance and combine
this strategy with other poverty reduction strategies. Furthermore, policy makers
and governments should construct policies that support basic education and health
in backward regions, making it easier for MFIs to penetrate in such areas and reach
out to the majority.
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Table 9: Countries of interest
Afghanistan Albania
Argentina Armenia
Azerbaijan Bangladesh
Benin Bolivia
Brazil Bulgaria
Burkina Faso Burundi
Cambodia Cameroon
Central African Republic Chad
Chile China
Colombia Congo
Costa Rica Cote d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast)
Croatia Dominican Republic
Ecuador Egypt
El Salvador Ethiopia
Gambia Georgia
Ghana Guinea
India Indonesia
Iraq Israel
Jordan Kazakhstan
Kenya Kyrgyzstan
Macedonia Madagascar
Mali Mexico
Moldova Mongolia
Morocco Mozambique
Namibia Nicaragua
Niger Nigeria
Pakistan Panama
Paraguay Peru
Philippines Romania
Russia Rwanda
Samoa Senegal
South Africa Sri Lanka
Sudan Swaziland
Syria Tajikistan
Tanzania Thailand
Togo Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia Turkey
Uganda Ukraine
Venezuela Vietnam
Zambia
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